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A legal-historical review of the EU competition rules, International & Comparative Law Quarterly 63 (2) 2014, 
281-316 
Anca D. Chirita 
Abstract This article aims to review EU competition rules by undertaking a historical purposive interpretation of the 
drafting process of the Treaty of Rome. It reveals new insights based on a consideration of several historical archives 
starting with the Schuman plan, the Founding Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and the 
negotiations of the Treaty of Rome. Questions of contemporary relevance are explored, relating to the goals of 
competition law, the historical distinction between ‘object’ and ‘effect’ under Article 101 TFEU, the possibility of an 
enforcement gap under Article 102 TFEU, the relationship between unfair competition and the prohibition of 
discrimination and, finally, the broader meaning of competitive distortions. 
 ‘Reason is sovereign of the World; that the history of the world, therefore, presents us with a rational process’.1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this article is quite straightforward: it is to understand the reasons and intention of the legislator when 
drafting EU competition rules and, by undertaking a holistic rather than exhaustive review of these rules, to answer a 
number of problematic contemporary questions from a historical-legal perspective. These questions are: Is economic 
efficiency the primary goal of EU competition law? What is the distinction between object and effect under Article 101 
TFEU? How does discrimination relate to EU unfair competition? Is there really a gap under Article 102 TFEU? What is the 
true meaning of a competitive distortion? What lessons can we learn from history for future amendments? 
Some of the above questions have been extensively and controversially debated in the literature, but the results have not 
been entirely satisfactory. By revisiting the genesis of EU competition rules and looking again at the original political 
statements, declarations and negotiations, this article will shed some light on present misunderstandings and offer a 
historical understanding of EU competition law. 
There is a blurred distinction between historical truth and reality. Law is not an exact science, and neither is history 
because there may always be something new to be revealed. There will always be a sense of evolutionary relativism, ie 
what is true today may be false tomorrow. In considering the question of what the goals of competition law actually are, 
European courts have been wise to follow a teleological interpretation in line with the objective of safeguarding 
‘undistorted’ competition. 
EU competition law is well known for its use of soft-law guidelines. Therefore, taking inspiration from Hegel's Philosophy 
of History,2 it seems useful to set out the methodology that will be used here when addressing the questions which are to 
be considered. Current understandings and misunderstandings will be reviewed in the light of the historical narrative 
concerning the drafting of EU competition rules--that is, a reflective historical interpretative approach will be adopted. 
During the discussion a pragmatic orientation will be maintained because of the need to be alert for contradictions in 
previous historical findings and to verify their plausibility. Next, a conceptual analysis based on historical findings will 
help us understand the current reality, even if these origins raise some troubling questions. In providing this historical 
review the aim is to challenge future enforcement and reveal possible legislative gaps that are the result of a lack of 
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detail or precision in the legal provisions. Standing on the edge between history and contemporary reality, it falls to 
European courts to fill the gaps which currently exist and, with reason and wisdom, to reshape the future enforcement of 
EU competition law. 
 
A. What Is the Primary Goal of EU Competition Law? 
Seemingly simple questions--such as ‘what is the primary goal of EU competition law’ --are often the most difficult to 
answer. Recently, a  comprehensive study of the goals of competition law has demonstrated the plurality of goals, 
depending on jurisdictions and normative values, their intersection and political dimension.3 
Misunderstandings among lawyers and economists are only one side of the coin. It has been said that jurisdictional 
ideologies do not always allow for similar goals to be pursued; for example, within the spirit of German ordoliberalism, 
some previous writers have claimed a clash between economic freedom and consumer welfare.4 In contrast, a leading 
representative of German ordo-liberalism contradicts the widespread belief that economic freedom cannot coexist with 
welfare.5 The origin of the clash lies in the fact that the ordo-liberal school of thought has been mostly linked to the early 
1930s, rather than the 1980s' social market economy and neo-liberalism.6 
Economic freedoms are mostly embedded in a ‘constitutional’ dimension,7 which forms the public law foundation of 
competition law. Once economic freedom to compete is institutionally established at a constitutional level it needs its 
own private law foundation, namely the freedom of contract, the objective of which is to achieve welfare and prosperity. 
Economic efficiency obviously serves this purpose and there is nothing to prevent both objectives from coexisting in 
unity. However, misunderstandings between ‘ends’ and ‘means’ create endless conflicts. 
 One commentator has suggested that productive efficiency is the original goal of EU competition law,8 based on the 
Spaak Report of Foreign Ministers. In sharp contrast, but based on the same historical archive in Florence, Forrester had 
previously identified many other goals alongside that of efficiency, such as market integration and consumer welfare 
(2000).9 Thus, two opinions based on the same archive do not really converge on the same issue and this suggests that 
something must have been overlooked10 or misinterpreted; or as one leading author11 put it, the conflict of goals is 
mirrored by the development of a new agenda, namely the ‘more economic approach’, which aims to match previous 
legal objectives with economic ones. Previously, the same author suggested that ordo-ideology had influenced EU 
competition law. 
What previous historical studies have missed is that legal historians had already published a three-volume collection of 
the historical archives on EU law (1999 and 2000), showing that the Treaty of Rome cannot be judged on the basis of the 
Spaak report only, which is a small piece of the preparatory work (travaux préparatoires ). Furthermore, the Treaty of 
Rome has to be analysed through the lens of its predecessor, the Founding Treaty establishing the European Community 
of Steel and Coal (ECSC),12 famously inspired by Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet.13 Elsewhere, Freyer mentions that 
two treaty Articles were drafted by Robert Bowie (formerly professor at Harvard Law School and legal counsel to the 
High Commission in Germany).14 The edited collection published in Berlin15 provides an opportunity to consult these 
documents. In addition, the collection covers the documents found in the European institutions' archives, as well as those 
found in the national archives of the founding member states and, most importantly, of the Foundation Jean Monnet in 
Lausanne.16 
    Page3 
The present understanding is that the founding treaties were generated by European ideas of economic integration and 
that they were designed to serve European citizens.17 Any modelling of Europe based on one particular national influence 
is said to be dangerous18 and counter-productive for European integration. 
The history of competition law must briefly look at the Robert Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950. The proposal that the 
production of coal and steel in both France and Germany be placed under a High Authority, with the participation of other 
European countries, has served as a basis for economic development and as a first step in a ‘European political 
federation’.19 In particular, the declaration advanced the future implementation of a plan of production and investments 
with a price mechanism and the creation of a reconversion fund to help facilitate the rationalization of production.20 The 
future European community (ECSC) was devised to counter an ‘international cartel aimed to divide and exploit national 
markets through restrictive practices and to maintain high profits’, thereby ensuring the integration of markets21 and 
increasing production of coal and steel.22 It was believed that conditions would gradually emerge which would ensure 
‘the most rational distribution of production and the highest level of productivity’ by means of the ‘pooling of 
resources’.23 
Competition goals were integrated into an international dimension of the fight against pernicious cartels. In a subsequent 
note, the objectives of the community, namely, the expansion of markets24 and rationalization of production,25 are 
further detailed, together with the means of action to be taken against cartels. It is in this particular context that the 
word ‘competition’ is first mentioned, as a means to counteract price-fixing, the attribution of production quotas and the 
division of markets. Cartels were associated with a ‘permanent elimination of competition resulting in the exploitation of 
markets by a particular profession’ and essentially secret agreements serving professional rather than the public 
interest.26 In the fight against cartels, the High Authority was called to ensure that the same market conditions which 
existed under perfect competition would prevail, without which the establishment of competition would face an 
insurmountable hurdle.27 
 It suffices to say here that the same great fight against international cartels was at the heart of the negotiation behind 
the Treaty of Rome.28 The tone was slightly different in that the context was the free global trading of goods, where not 
only did inter-state trade barriers have to be eliminated, but private restraints on competition also had to be controlled 
internationally through the establishment of an international trade organization with provisions on competition.29 
Obviously, this served the very ambitious goal of the World Trade Organization (WTO) of international cartels being 
controlled by an international trade chamber.30 Over the years since the Havana Charter, such an international 
agreement on competition rules has become a ‘dead letter’.31 Additionally, the Spaak Report at the Messina conference 
in 1955 acknowledged that the Common Market should benefit consumers through both quality and price competition due 
to different production costs being borne by undertakings.32 
Greater similarities with a general catalogue of goals in future treaties, but significantly specialized to serve competition 
goals, are revealed by the role of the High Authority in the pricing of coal and steel.33 A factor underlying the shaping of 
competition policy was the lack of price elasticity in the production of coal. Briefly, competition law was called upon to: 
(a) safeguard the normal ‘game’ (jeu ) of competition 
(b) ensure the stable supply of both coal and steel within the Common Market 
 (c) identify optimal conditions for growth and expansion 
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(d) maintain a competitive industry in order to benefit consumers with regard to both price and quality 
(e) ensure that pricing conditions within the Common Market did not discriminate against buyers, especially in a country 
other than that of the provider, while maintaining free choice for consumers in respect of suppliers or place of delivery 
(f) ensure that export prices remained within equitable limits for both buyers and producers 
(g) protect producers against practices of unfair or artificial competition34 
(h) ensure that the normal mechanism of competition was not distorted by discriminatory practices against producers 
by certain buyers or groups of buyers35 
(i) possibly consider a policy of rational exploitation and conservation of the natural resources of the Common Market. 
This brief account of the huge role of the High Authority clearly demonstrates that some of the emerging goals of 
competition law were rooted in economics: competition as a game of supply and demand servicing consumers and their 
freedom of choice. With unfair competition, including the protection afforded to producers, this image reflects a total 
welfare standard. Even the meaning of distortion receives modest recognition. 
This historical review of goals highlights the methods of intervention by the Authority.36 Indirect production methods 
demand combined action involving both natural resources and consumption, eventually followed by direct governmental 
intervention to align prices with demand.37 The latter was by no means excluded as a means of price control, though 
experts warned it would not be possible to determine price levels due to a lack of (economic) criteria.38 Within the 
context of industrial concentrations, we are reminded that the primary goal of the Schuman Plan was to establish a 
Common Market and to create the conditions capable of attaining the highest possible level of productivity and the lowest 
price for two relevant products.39 The future Article 60 was intended to prevent price-fixing, and the control of 
production, technical development and the division of markets by agreements  between producers.40 This explains why 
market integration has been at the heart of EU competition policy and how the drafting of the treaty reflected the 
secondary goal of productive efficiency. 
The essential economic goal of the Schuman Plan (1950) was to satisfy the needs of the community by creating a market 
within which undertakings are stimulated to increase their productivity.41 The way to achieve this ambitious objective 
was thought to be to develop competition.42 This finally explains the endless debate over ends and means and why 
competition policy (the Schuman Plan) had to be the means to an end. 
An original draft working paper on the Treaty of Rome (1955) reveals that competition was again the means ‘to the 
establishing and the normal functioning of the Common Market’ insofar as ‘it requires the elimination of those measures 
and practices which alter competition or which are unfair’.43 The way forward during its progressive establishment was 
the natural ‘game of competition’; in special cases, however, a rational specialization of production could be sought.44 
The prohibition of horizontal concentrations which threatened to create monopolies was a fundamental condition for 
attaining the objectives of the Schuman Plan.45 
An extremely interesting revelation concerns the risk of market domination, probably in the spirit of the US 
monopolization of markets,46 and the fact that this should not be predetermined by absolute criteria, nor placed under 
any rigid rule determining the total market percentage of a product (1950).47 The US influence of restraints in trade is 
supported by Article 66(6) ECSC, points 1 to 4 of which concern fining economic concentrations, referring to any natural 
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person, ie individuals. Distortions of competition were thought possible within coal and steel or their consumer 
industries.48 The Spaak Report (1955) mentioned that monopolization through the absorption or domination of the 
product market by one single undertaking takes away the benefits of technical advance.49 
A draft working paper of the Common Market Commission argues that the establishment of ‘expanding’ competition 
throughout the Common Market is necessary in order to attain the ‘most rational distribution of production at 
the  highest possible level of productivity’.50 It states that this cannot be achieved solely through the elimination of 
exchange barriers such as custom rights, quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect; it also 
requires the introduction of provisions which will ensure that ‘the game of competition would not be distorted’.51 
What does this review of thinking between 1950 and 1955 tell us about the present? In recent years, productive efficiency 
has moved to a strategy of making the Union one of the most dynamic and competitive ‘knowledge-based’ economies52 
and, as a result, dynamic efficiency receives greater recognition.53 One of the goals of the Treaty of Paris was to 
achieve productive efficiency to better serve coal and steel consumers, but this prevalent factor in the development of 
society in the 1950s did not impede a shift to dynamic efficiency, capturing high technology markets and dynamic 
competition, thus further progressing towards achieving all the envisaged fundamental freedoms of the internal market 
found in the Treaty of Rome and beyond. 
Recently, the Commissioner for Competition, Joaquin Almunia, placed a highly competitive ‘social market economy’ at the 
heart of competition policy and, more recently, contemplated the potential of competition law as a means of supporting 
innovation policy regarding renewable energies.54 His mandate regards competition policy ‘as a means of strengthening 
our social market economy, and enhancing its efficiency and fairness’.55 Competition policy is once again being seen as 
a means of delivering some policy aims other than efficiency and is emphasizing that, putting aside competition jargon, 
capitalistic competition and the social market economy should sit easily alongside each other. Therefore, it is clear that 
in the Lisbon Treaty a new goal of EU competition policy is to be highly competitive ‘outside’ the EU, while being ‘social’ 
within it.56 
 
 B. What Is the Distinction between ‘Object’ and ‘Effect’ under Article 101 TFEU? 
Recently, the distinction between object and effect has been extensively discussed in the European literature.57 
However, this question needs a deeper historical review in order to identify how it was shaped in the early 1950s. In this 
context ‘object’ is a synonym for ‘purpose’. The Schuman Plan envisaged that agreements between undertakings ‘having 
as an object’ the limitation of the production of coal and steel, the division of markets or the fixing of prices should be 
prohibited.58 Monnet, however, argued that such agreements should be permitted where they encouraged production 
and the most efficient use of existing tools. In such cases the High Authority could have authorized agreements between 
undertakings which had as their object (ie purpose) their merging or specialization.59 
 
1. The original drafting proposals (ECSC) 
Except for Article 101(1)(e), Article 101 refers generally to ‘agreements’, not to legally enforceable contracts.60 The 
original German proposal used the term ‘contracts’ instead of ‘agreements’, in particular ‘contracts that undertakings 
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conclude in pursuit of a common purpose and which influence production or market relations for trade in goods in 
restraint of competition’.61 
The High Authority had to authorize ‘only those contracts and decisions which are likely to increase the performance and 
efficiency62 of the *I.C.L.Q. 292  undertakings involved as regards their technical, business administration63 and 
organizational relations, thereby improving the meeting of demand without any unjustified modification of prices and 
terms and conditions in dealings with the respective goods and commercial services’.64 Therefore, the High Authority 
was stipulating that contracts ought not to be prohibited per se where there is the likelihood of increasing economic 
efficiency as regards existing technology, business administration and the organization of the undertakings concerned. 
This means that the micro-economics of industrial organization are at the core of this drafting proposal. However, 
undertakings were not required to contribute to technological and economic advance. Rather, the draft suggested 
meeting the demand of customers of coal and steel without any unjustified modification of trading terms and conditions, 
including pricing. 
In the original draft there is also no mention of consumers sharing the benefits resulting from any resulting 
enhancement in economic performance or efficiency. A French proposal had suggested that the rules envisaged by the 
Schuman Plan should stimulate undertakings to increase their productivity steadily so as to benefit consumers of coal 
and steel. The proposal suggested prohibiting those practices, namely, commercial deals and ‘any’ agreements, which 
had as their purpose65 or had the direct or indirect ‘result’66 of preventing,67 restraining or altering free competition 
and, in particular, of fixing prices, limiting or controlling production in any manner, or of dividing markets, production, 
customers or sources of supply.68 This change from the *I.C.L.Q. 293  initial German proposal concerning contracts to 
the French proposal concerning agreements resulted in Article 101 becoming more restrictive. 
It appears that the German proposal came to be influenced by the French terminology of legal acts,69 according to 
which, in order to be legally enforceable, agreements had to have a valid object and a legitimate cause in order to have 
legal effect.70 Similarly, under English contract law, agreements that are unsupported by the intention to create legal 
relations might not be legally enforceable, even if they are supported by economic consideration, ie economic value.71 
However, in the context of commercial agreements, a strong legal presumption operates whereby the courts presume 
that the parties to the agreement do indeed intend to create legal relations.72 The onus of rebutting the presumption lies 
with the undertaking seeking to do so. 
 
2. The French distinction between cause/effect and object 
In order to understand the legal implications of the sudden shift from the use of the term ‘contract’ to ‘agreement’, which 
subsequently triggered the shift from the German term ‘result’ (Ergebnis ) to the French term ‘effect’ (effet ), it is 
necessary to examine the distinction between the ‘cause’ and ‘object’ of legal acts under French civil law. The distinction 
between legitimate cause and valid object concerns issues of illegality and public policy. Thus the purpose of the contract 
must exist, be determined or determinable and be lawful.73 The cause of a contract includes both an objective aspect 
(the cause of the obligation to pay, similar to consideration under English law, which is derived from Roman *I.C.L.Q. 
294  law) and a subjective aspect (concerning its morality, and, which is derived from canon law).74 
Basically, object and cause are the classical civil law criteria which determine if an agreement is legitimate or not. If it is 
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illegitimate or illicit, then the agreement is either null or void. Obviously, competition agreements do not exist in a 
vacuum and may be entered into in a commercial context without fulfilling certain legal formalities such as the exchange 
of written contracts. Briefly, the form of such agreements is irrelevant as long as there is an illegal cause (purpose or 
aim) which falls under Article 101(a)-(e). Otherwise, any discrete agreements such as arrangements, exchanges or 
collaborations--even if concluded orally--would be strictly prohibited as a sort of illegality or ‘conspiracy’ to it. 
Initially, the ‘object’ of an agreement was to be identified by having a specialization or merger as its subject-matter. 
Thus, the current distinction between the same ‘object’ as purpose and ‘effect’, ie legal effect of an agreement, namely, 
civil or criminal sanctions, can only be properly understood on the basis of the French proposal, which embraces a 
broader range of legal acts. By contrast, an earlier German proposal referred only to contracts,75 instead of 
agreements. This is one of the reasons why Article 101 is so broad in scope, since in addition to formal contracts it covers 
those agreements which might have the same effect as legally enforceable contracts. Otherwise, loose agreements, 
informal quasi-contracts such as cartels, gentlemen's agreements, interfirm collaborations,76 exchanges of 
confidential information77 or disclosures would have remained outside its scope. What really matters is whether there 
are restrictive practices as described under Article 101(1). 
In conclusion, the distinction between object and effect needs to be placed in its general civilian context, whereas the 
restrictive practices in (a)-(e) relate to the special economic/commercial context. Current controversies are due to the 
different legal traditions which influenced the drafting of the founding treaties. 
 
 3. A refined French proposal 
Another French draft78 prohibits any undertaking from taking concerted action with another undertaking to conclude 
‘any agreement whose purpose79 or direct or indirect result within the Common Market was: a) to prevent, restrain or 
alter, in any manner, the natural game of competition and in particular the price; b) to restrict or control production in 
any way; and c) to divide markets, products, clients or sources of supply’. 
This proposal focuses on coordinated behaviour, irrespective of the existence of any agreements. It distinguishes clearly 
between purpose and particular consequences, following the German proposal, except for a subtle change, resulting 
from translation challenges, to the effect that the German expression ‘free competition’ was replaced by the French 
‘game of competition’. The German proposal strongly encouraged free competition for both coal and steel, according to 
which it stated that market participants should not act in ways which run counter to the principle of competition based 
on performance, which it can logically be concluded refers to efficiency.80 Therefore, restrictive practices are 
prohibited in order to prevent the creation and exploitation of a dominant economic position to the disadvantage of 
producers or consumers.81 
In contrast, the German proposal refers to the decisions of associations of undertakings and contracts which would be 
prohibited if capable of influencing production and market conditions for free trade with coal and steel. The exception to 
this prohibition envisages the authorization of those agreements that are capable of improving the functionality of the 
Common Market or of contributing to the increase in economic performance and efficiency of the undertakings involved 
as regards their technology, business administration and organization, and thereby helping to meet demand (for coal 
*I.C.L.Q. 296  and steel).82 The same balancing of economic advantages against the resulting disadvantages following 
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the restriction of competition is required to prove the agreement falls under this exception. 
 
4. Eventual errors in legal translation 
Interestingly, the French proposal prohibits all agreements or decisions by ‘associations of producers’ and all concerted 
practices aimed, directly or indirectly, at preventing, restricting or altering the natural game of competition.83 It refers 
to the same particular practices, such as price-fixing, restriction or control of production or technology, but also 
introduces mention of investments. However, an exception to the prohibition is foreseen for those ‘agreements by 
undertakings having as an object the specialization of their production or the joint purchase or sale of the above 
products,84 where: 
(a) such specialization or joint purchase/sale increases substantially productive efficiency or product distribution (of 
coal and steel);85 
(b) the agreement in question is essential in order to achieve the above result and it does not restrict the undertakings' 
initiative more than is necessary for that purpose; 
(c) the undertakings in question are not likely to be able to control or limit production or a substantial portion of the 
particular products within the Common Market; 
 (d) the agreement, specialization or joint purchase/sale does not prevent effective competition in the Common Market 
in respect of the products in question’. 
This text makes far more sense than Article 101(3) itself, in particular in exempting specialization or joint agreements 
which increase productive efficiency86 or product distribution, but without requiring a ‘fair share of the resulting 
benefit’ to be passed on to consumers. On balance, commercial freedom or freedom of action is preserved and whilst the 
last two conditions are less restrictive than Article 101(3) (b), they do ‘afford such undertakings the possibility of 
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question’. 
On the whole, the proposal is less restrictive as it only places under scrutiny certain types of agreements the purpose 
(object) of which is specialization or joint purchase or sale, rather than all agreements which aim to restrict competition. 
As we have seen, when the proposal was translated into German,87 it substituted the word ‘undertakings’ for that of 
‘producers’, and changed the word ‘game’ to refer to normal competition,88 while adding to price-fixing the alternative 
of ‘influencing’. Finally, it left out four cumulative conditions because it saw these as being identical. 
Suetens's personal draft proposal (1950) maintains this subtle change of associations of producers to associations of 
undertakings.89 It refers to concerted practices capable of influencing, through an unjustified restriction of 
competition, either the production or the functioning of the Common Market for coal and steel. This draft then firmly 
prohibits ‘any’ agreements, decisions or practices, which in an artificial or abus ive manner would limit production or 
impede technical progress, maintain or lower prices, or reserve markets or sources of supply for certain producers.90 
In this draft too, and for the first time, technical advance is mentioned. However, it is unclear what kind of technical 
advance is envisaged. It was only during the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome (1956)91 that elements of intellectual 
property (IP) become part of the balancing needed for a specialization agreement, namely, that the intellectual property 
creator proves that the agreement actually improves the production or distribution or that it promotes technological 
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and economic advance. 
 
5. Relative versus absolute nullity? 
An important feature92 of the prohibition in Article 101 worth highlighting is that agreements which have certain 
conditions ensuring that specialization and joint agreements will not have restrictive effects are not subject to absolute 
prohibition. Article 101(3) provides an exception to absolute nullity, in that restrictions by effect would need further 
consideration (ie they are a ‘relative nullity’) and are not automatically void. Bearing in mind the previous distinction 
between written contracts and loose agreements, Article 101(1) triggers absolute nullity for any restriction by object 
from Article 101 (a)-(e). Innumerable other changes are included in ECSC's Article 60.93 Most notable is a sudden change 
of perspective concerning the authorization of specialized agreements or joint purchase/sale agreements by including 
as an alternative ‘other similar agreements’94 if such agreements contribute to a ‘significant’95 improvement of 
production or distribution.96 In one of the four cumulative conditions97 the word ‘effects’ replaces ‘result’, which 
changes the previously moderated approach to one which covers the initiatives of all types of under-takings. This change 
reads as follows: ‘the agreement in question is essential to reach the above effects (namely, significant improvements), 
without being more restrictive than is demanded by its purpose’.98 The next condition99 is the requirement not to 
impede effective competition within the Common Market. 
However, thereafter, the situation became even more complicated. Article 60(3) requires the notification of any 
agreement or concerted practice among competing undertakings and of the decisions of associations of undertakings, 
irrespective of their purpose,100 if not concluded in writing to be  submitted for the approval of the High Authority.101 
Otherwise, they are to be declared contrary to the ECSC Treaty. Thus, if the High Authority were to find that certain 
agreements are very similar, based on their ‘nature (type) or effects’ as under Article 60(1)(a)-(c), they may only be 
authorized if the same conditions are met.102 This means that specialization agreements are not the only agreements 
that can justify an exception to the above absolute prohibition under Article 101. 
Another modifying proposal refers to those agreements likely to cause the effects mentioned under Article 60(1).103 A 
notable change of approach concerns the last cumulative condition of Article 61(2)(d), where the wording requires that 
such agreements should not have as a ‘net effect’ the reduction of competition within the Common Market.104 Finally, 
Article 60(1) prohibits by rendering an absolute nullity ‘all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations 
of producers and concerted practices’ aimed at preventing, restricting or distorting the normal game of competition.105 
It even stipulates that undertakings granted an exemption on the basis of Article 61(3) by means of false or inaccurate 
information are to be fined with a maximum of double their annual revenues on the products that were the object of the 
agreement or decision contrary to Article 61, irrespective of whether their object appears to be solely to restrict 
production, technical development or investments.106 
 
6. Some preliminary remarks on the drafting history of the above distinction 
Hopefully, the above overview of the development of ECSC provisions helps us to understand the text prior to the drafting 
of the Treaty of Rome and why the ECSC is indisputably its primary inspirational source.107 For those who still doubt this, 
a historical document containing ECSC provisions provided the starting point for negotiations for the Treaty of Rome at 
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the Messina conference.108 Later, the French delegation presented an excerpt of their Pricing Regulation no 45/1483 of 
June 1945, as amended by the Decree of August 1953. This regulation prohibits concerted actions, all ‘understandings’ (a 
synonym for ‘agreements’)109 and express or silent arrangements, including collusion110 or concentrations (the latter 
being prohibited irrespective of form and purpose) having the purpose or result (effect) of preventing free competition 
so as to reduce production costs or sale prices or to allow artificial price increases.111 
A subsequent draft (1956) uses words even more economically, the wording being ‘all agreements between undertakings 
and all decisions by undertakings which have as an object or as an effect the prevention of competition, in particular by 
fixing prices or elements thereof; limiting production, distribution or investments; preventing technical or economic 
advance; dividing markets, products, clients or sources of supply’.112 It states that such agreements or decisions may be 
authorized provided that the claimant is able to prove that they actually contribute to the improvement of production or 
distribution or the promotion of technical or economic advance. Here the claimant needs to prove that this will benefit 
consumers. 
Yet another innovation was made by a group of legal experts who added two further requirements to this Article 
101(3).113 As previously mentioned, a French proposal required the IP author to prove an actual improvement of 
production, distribution or the promotion of technical or economic progress,114 including the consumers' fair share. In 
contrast, the German proposal changed the IP author to the neutral ‘claimant/applicant’, which diverts the intended 
scope of the application of IPRs.115 The group of experts who drew up the final draft added the requirement that ‘such a 
contribution should not run counter to the objectives of the treaty’116 as regards the improvement in question by 
imposing on the undertakings concerned limitations which are not indispensable for the attainment of these objectives. 
However, the original understanding of ‘objectives’ does not seem to have been solely the promotion of technical 
progress and so on, but was to be generally derived from the treaty's future goals. This allows a greater flexibility in 
balancing different types of efficiencies corresponding to other goals to be pursued in the name of competition, for 
example, social goals.117 
Finally, a clause referring to affecting trade between Member States was introduced (1954) for agreements, decisions 
and concerted practices ‘which are likely to have’ a harmful effect118 on the Common Market.119 The same wording is 
used twice, which proves that harmful ‘effects’ were not an alien concept in the 1950s. At the last minute, ‘categories’ of 
agreements were introduced under ex- Article 85(3) EC.120 As the above discussion makes clear, in the absence of any 
discussion within the ECSC, the drafting of the Treaty of Rome alone reveals all too little regarding the distinction 
between object and effect. Since Article 101 incorporates this somewhat confusing distinction without ever mentioning 
contracts under Article 101(1), it is easy to confuse the enforceability of agreements that require an intention to produce 
legal effects with the restrictive effect required under Article 101(3). They are not necessarily the same thing. Without a 
doubt, the drafting process of adding, removing and translating provisions has made the final text of Article 85 EC 
somewhat inaccessible. This explains why the case law has been the subject of many controversies for competition 
commentators. 
For example, GlaxoSmithKline121 concerned a wholesalers' distribution agreement ‘General Sales Conditions’, which was 
sent for negative clearance (authorization) to the Commission. The agreement covered the cross-border (parallel) trade 
in medicines for which national price regulations already existed before it was drawn up. However, Spanish wholesalers 
had accepted the above sales conditions in writing, which meant that this agreement clearly fell under Article 101(1)(a), ie 
‘fixing any other trading conditions’.122 GSK claimed that it merely intended to market medicines, but not to restrict 
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competition. The General Court found that the Commission erred in law when it found that the agreement had both the 
object and the effect of restricting competition.123 It was claimed that the Commission should have established the 
‘effects’ of the agreement, ie that GSK restricted competition to the detriment of the final consumer under Article 
101(3).124 This argument was subsequently rejected by the Court of Justice.125 The court said that since the agreement 
was in writing it was therefore legally enforceable. Even if the agreement referred only to sale conditions, and did not 
intend to fix the price, under Article 101(a) both are alternative criteria,126 it satisfied the ‘object’ restriction. The 
agreement was therefore capable of producing legal effects. The analysis of effects for ‘any’ agreements, followed by a 
heavy burden of proof, makes the granting of an exemption of this type highly unlikely. 
More recently, the Commission found in MasterCard127 that a multilateral interchange fee (MIF) between the issuing and 
the acquiring bank on the settlement of card transactions had restrictive effects on competition in the acquiring 
market.128 The fee restricted competition between acquiring banks to the detriment of merchants and their customers 
as it operated both on the acquisition of cross-border transactions and on the acquisition of domestic transactions.129 
The MIFs could not be regarded as ‘ancillary’ restrictions because they were not objectively necessary for the operation 
of an open payment card scheme.130 Debit cards generated important commercial benefits other than interchange 
fees131 and these debit cards were not necessary for the economic viability of the banks in question. 
The restriction was ‘directly related’ to the implementation of the main operation and subordinate to it.132 The concept of 
ancillary restriction of competition has also been applied in a UK banking charges case,133 when UK banks operated an 
overdraft facility ‘free-if-in credit’ for customers having their current accounts with the bank. In that case, the initial 
agreement was later varied by a separate credit service agreement, which was ancillary to the main operation and 
generated profits for the respective banks. Put simply, the overdraft facility subsidized the running of current accounts 
at zero costs. 
Mastercard is another case where it is clear that there was a restriction by object which ‘by its very nature’ had the 
potential to fix prices indirectly, that is to say, at the intermediary level of the participating banks which would be passed 
on indirectly to final consumers.134 The General Court limited its judicial review of ancillarity to procedural grounds. 
From an economic perspective, the ancillary nature of such a restriction entails complex economic assessments which 
were previously carried out by the Commission.135 
In conclusion, once the purpose of the commercial agreement falls clearly under Article 101(1) (a)-(e), a legal 
presumption of restriction of competition by ‘object’ operates against the concerned undertakings. It is for the 
undertakings concerned to rebut the presumption. The present historical review of the ‘object/effect’ distinction during 
the drafting of the founding Treaties demonstrates that as it stands the law mirrors a strong public enforcement 
mechanism against illegitimate restrictions of competition by ‘object’. Agreements having an unlawful purpose such as 
price-fixing are automatically void. The presumption of the application of this prohibition is difficult to rebut. 
Undertakings need to justify their own commercial interests within the scope of Article 101(3) by demonstrating that they 
are improving overall economic efficiency. The original proposals reveal some scope for more flexibility and 
differentiated approaches to technical and economic progress in the context of specialized agreements and IPRs. As we 
have seen, the German and French proposals reveal certain differentiated linguistic approaches that highlight the 
understanding of commercial agreements in the civil continental context of cause/object and effect/nullity under 
French and German civil law. 
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 C. How Does Discrimination Relate to EU Unfair Competition? 
For common-law competition lawyers, unfair competition136 does not belong to traditional competition policy and 
therefore its historical review is welcome. Nevertheless, the principle of ‘fair’ competition is included in the preamble to 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Unfortunately the extent to which ‘some’ of the national laws against 
unfair competition should later be enacted at supranational level is left open.137 The seeds of unfair competition law in 
the ECSC treaty are closely related to the prohibition of discrimination. A note on the deconcentration of the Ruhr region 
(1951) mentions that its reorganization was essential to create a common market by effectively enforcing the treaty's 
rules on fair competition and non-discrimination.138 
As has already been mentioned, at the start of the Messina conference, a historical document containing ECSC provisions 
became the inspiration for the negotiations of the Treaty of Rome.139 Later, the French delegation presented an excerpt 
of their Pricing Regulation no 45/1483 of June 1945 as amended by the Decree of August 1953. The true meaning of this 
excerpt can only be fully understood in the context of price discrimination and unfair competition. 
At the Messina Conference (1955), the Committee for the Common Market (Investments and Social Issues) mentioned in 
its working paper the various factors that influence competition, noting that competition rules are needed to ensure free 
competition within the Common Market, in particular to protect against any form of national discrimination. It also makes 
reference to ‘fair competition’ through the control of dumping and cartels.140 The recognition of fairness in the 
international trade context of dumping proves that at least the provisions against international cartels and 
discrimination belong to unfair trade, ie unfair competition. Historically, Messina is a turning point in terms of 
perspective: first, it represented the start of the Treaty of Rome negotiations   and, secondly, recognized a subtle, 
positive function of fair competition.141 Thus, it still refers to unfair competition in the context of approximation of 
national provisions.142 The group of experts for the Common Market clearly decided to opt for a ‘positive style’ in 
drafting the prohibition of discrimination.143 This explains why, in the final version of the treaty, unfair competition 
appears only in the preamble, disguised as fair competition. 
In case it is unclear why discrimination has been central under Article 102, it is necessary to point out that in the 1954 
document discrimination is dealt with in conjunction with the abusive exploitation of a dominant position, where the 
economic definition of discrimination is of ‘a differential treatment of similar categories of suppliers or buyers which is 
not justified by cost differences’.144 The absolute prohibition on discrimination concerns only grounds of nationality. 
However, as previously mentioned,145 the protection afforded to producers against unfair competition practices is one 
of the roles given to the High Authority under the ECSC. In the original proposal, Article 56 ECSC prohibits unfair or 
artificial competition pricing practices, in particular, solely temporary or local price-cutting having as a purpose the 
attainment of a monopoly position within the Common Market.146 Furthermore, it also prohibits discriminatory practices 
leading to different treatment amongst buyers, based  on their nationality or the application by the same seller of 
different conditions to buyers in a similar position.147 This proposal illuminates our understanding of Article 102(2)(a), 
which seems to have merged unfair pricing with other trading conditions, where the interpretation of unfair pricing is 
mostly148 obscure.149 In other words, it is difficult to grasp the intention behind including the terms ‘directly or 
indirectly’ in the draft innovation, which were introduced by the expert group for the Common Market (1956) in both 
Article 101(1)(a) and Article 102(2)(a).150 The origins of unfair pricing help us understand that the direct imposition of 
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unfair pricing by a dominant undertaking might be traced to the first limb of Article 56, when the imposition of unfair 
trading conditions would indirectly amount to discriminatory treatment of buyers or suppliers regarding terms and 
conditions other than pricing. A previous ECSC draft (1951) refers to ‘measures or practices that lead to a discrimination 
among producers or sellers or consumers, in particular with regard to pricing, supply conditions or transportation fees, 
as well as those practices that impede the seller's free choice of his supplier’.151 Here, temporary price-cutting at the 
expense of maintaining the production capacity is regarded as discrimination against customers.152 In support of this 
idea is the positive definition of competition aimed at ‘ensuring access to production to all similar consumers’. 153 
Hindering or impeding buyers' free choice and the application of dissimilar conditions to similar transactions by one and 
the same seller are considered to be particular forms of discrimination.154 Interestingly, it is suggested that producers 
are interested in being safeguarded against unfair competition practices. 
 The High Authority later defined price as the producer's profits after taxation.155 Dumping is defined as pricing below 
the published list-price or the price-matching of another supplier, irrespective of whether the supplier belongs to the 
Community or to a third country.156 Furthermore, the draft clearly states that meeting the prices of competing suppliers 
should be allowed, even through rewards or rebates, as long as this information is published in the price list.157 
Under the ECSC, the principle of non-discrimination aims not to impose any disadvantages on undertakings that have not 
merged.158 The High Authority was called upon to consider those disadvantages that could lead to an ‘inequality in the 
competitive conditions of the discriminated undertakings’.159 Put differently, discrimination is said to mean the 
differential treatment of sellers or buyers through the application of dissimilar conditions to similar businesses, or 
refusals to supply.160 This proposed definition, however, does not meet all expectations161 since charging the same price 
was considered questionable in the case of ‘fungible goods’, ie goods which are commercially interchangeable, where list 
prices or stock exchanges could be a better option. 
The original draft of the Treaty of Rome maintains the substance of the ECSC treaty on the ‘differential treatment of 
sellers or buyers through the application of dissimilar conditions to similar business deals or through refusals to supply 
or receive in relation to the abuse of dominant positions or agreements between undertakings’ and which affect trade 
between the founding Member States.162 The Common Market Committee (1955) referred to normal competitive 
conditions amongst producers, namely, ‘individuals or undertakings marketing the products for sale with the aim of 
gaining profits’.163 The aim of this was no doubt to exclude from the ambit of competition any intervention of public 
authorities that do not pursue a profitseeking activity, for example, social subventions granted directly to consumers, 
research institutes or subsidies granted for reasons of national security.164 
 The same Committee then advanced price discrimination as a prominent discriminatory or restrictive practice among 
private commercial relations.165 As mentioned previously, one form of price discrimination is dumping, which consists 
of the ‘application of more advantageous conditions than the sale conditions of a given supplier and in lieu of delivery 
those which result from meeting the sale conditions of another supplier’;166 another form is double pricing,167 that is, 
the application of more onerous sale conditions than those of a given supplier. These ban such practices among Member 
States' undertakings but the wording is mindful that once competition is functioning effectively among different national 
economies and following the elimination of exchange barriers, such practices will gradually disappear.168 A clear 
purpose of dumping is offered in a footnote,169 which states that the intention of predatory pricing is ‘to eliminate a 
competitor or to prevent the development of competition with the aim of ensuring certain monopoly positions on a given 
market’. However, price discrimination is maintained as a possible consequence of an abuse of a dominant position or 
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concerted practice (entente) among undertakings. In this particular setting, it is clearly envisaged that price 
discrimination will exist among Member States and therefore be based on nationality. Other forms mentioned include 
refusals to supply or accept and, notably, disadvantageous delivery delays.170 Price discrimination is closely related to 
restrictive trade measures which effectively amount to exchange barriers. The elimination of such barriers would run 
foul of the law if producers were to divide markets for their own profit gains. 
The insightful discussion in this report culminates with the prohibition of: 
(a) practices that might ‘restrict the game of competition’ caused by the abuse of monopoly positions 171 or concerted 
practices among undertakings which might affect trade between Member States and 
(b) discriminatory practices of suppliers or consumers172 through the application of different conditions, in particular 
pricing applied to similar transactions or by a refusal to supply or accept as a result of an abuse of a dominant position 
or concerted practice, insofar as the discrimination is grounded on the basis of nationality.173 
This very final conclusion, while comparatively concise, offers no accurate description of discrimination. Therefore, it 
does not help us understand the wider context of why price discrimination was included in the treaty. 
The Report of the Foreign Ministers174 which came next stresses discrimination over ‘pricing or other sale conditions in 
similar transactions or the refusal to deliver’. More clearly it articulated the discrimination of buyers/sellers within the 
context of the contract of sale in another draft proposal (1956), ie the ‘unjustified differential treatment of buyers or 
sellers at the conclusion of contracts’.175 In oligopolistic structures, however, it seems that discrimination is often a 
primary step towards a general price alteration in order to maintain the elasticity of price.176 Therefore, the draft 
states that only the intentional differential treatment of buyers or suppliers through cartels or monopolies should be 
prohibited.177 This proves that the element of intention is essential for its future enforcement in relation to both 
monopolies and oligopolies.178 
Somewhat surprising is a late proposal (1956) that price increases or pricecutting in comparable deals, which may 
consolidate a dominant position, should not be dealt with under discrimination, but as unfair competition against 
competitors.179 That is to say price-cutting that is temporary but is not locally limited, which benefits all buyers and 
aims to attain a dominant position, should not be exempted solely because it does not amount to discrimination among 
trading partners.180 Finally, cartels and monopolies, which have as a purpose or effect the impediment of competition 
for a particular product by one undertaking or a group of undertakings, should also deal with any practices that eliminate 
competitors from the market.181 Since discriminatory practices do not limit competition, but are subject to more 
stringent rules, there is the stipulation that they should be policed only in cases of unfair competition.182 
 Regarding the previously advanced concept of monopolization183 some major institutional proposals in the late 1950s 
are insightful. First, they require that a consulting committee on concentrations and discriminations needs to be used for 
mediation and arbitration and, secondly, where no solution has been accepted, that a court with specialized chambers of 
mixed formation should be employed, ie a court which includes both lawyers (ie jurists) and experts in economics or 
experts with a technical background.184 A somewhat similar requirement is included for the abuse prohibition where it is 
stipulated that a decisional ‘instance’ rather than a court should be set up185 because competition rulings are 
politico-economic decisions rather than court judgments.186 Nowadays, we may well be mindful of having such experts 
in courts, but we do not need more political influence for which we have already appointed a full College of 
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Commissioners. 
 
D. Is There Really a ‘Gap’ under Article 102 TFEU? 
Another interesting question is whether there is a legislative gap under Article 102 which prohibits the abuse of a 
dominant position by one or more undertakings. The gap under Article 102 is confirmed by the existence of both 
oligopolies187 and stricter rules below the dominance threshold in many Member States on which the EU Commission (DG 
Competition) recently commissioned a study.188 However, lawyers seldom blindly follow economists' views and require 
some proof or backing of their statements. There are several ways to prove the existence of this gap. One way would be 
to see how an industrial organization deals with the issue of monopoly and how oligopoly completes the overall 
picture.189 Compared to the single model of monopoly that exists, there are many models of oligopoly. Under all of these, 
a firm must consider rival firms' behaviour in order to determine its own best policy and, therefore, interrelationships 
between firms are paramount.190 The only problem is that oligopoly models rely on different assumptions about how 
firms behave whereas, although most economists agree about their basic characteristics, they do not necessarily agree 
on the best way to control oligopolistic markets.191 A somewhat weaker and reluctantly applied jurisprudential 
recognition of the problems caused by oligopolies comes from collective dominance. The existence of collective 
dominance requires a certain degree of parallel behaviour amongst oligopolists, ie the ability to know how other 
members of the dominant oligopoly are behaving; to know that such a tacit coordination is sustainable over time; and to 
know that the foreseeable reaction of competitors and consumers will not jeopardize the results expected.192 
Another approach is to see how historical approaches show what Article 102 once was and, finally, to draw a clear 
conclusion on what Article 102 should be. One idea of which every competition lawyer has heard is that Article 102 is all 
about the abuse of a dominant position by one or more undertakings. However, the words ‘position’ or ‘abuse’ have no 
definition in the text of the treaty, which makes it really difficult, without any imagination, to examine whether the 
concept of dominance can also cover the difficult problem of oligopolies. 
A memorandum on the elimination of anticompetitive practices (1954)193 explains the background principles of the ECSC, 
namely, the idea that private parties may limit competition through the conclusion of contracts (similar to restraints in 
trade) and the development of market dominant ‘positions’. The original use of the plural for power or market 
positions194 is explained by reference to ‘contracts and decisions which influence the market’ (Article 60) and the 
creation of a powerful market position as result of a merger. The ‘Principles for the free game of competition’ also used 
three times on the same page to refer to ‘abuse of monopoly positions’. Similarly, the initial drafting of the treaty of 
Rome referred to the abuse of dominant market positions.195 This is later confirmed in a Note on the Meeting of the 
Common Market Working Group (1956) by an oral German proposal that ‘monopolies and oligopolies should be formally 
separated from cartels and dealt with according to the abuse principle’.196 Different from cartels, it is stated that 
monopolies ought to prohibit the abuse of such a ‘position’, not its creation, through acquisitions or takeovers.197 From 
this previous note, there becomes apparent a sudden change of attitude on the part of the German delegation's leader, 
Professor Müller-Armack, who demanded more general principles in the future treaty instead of detailed competition 
rules, allegedly saying that ‘even comprehensive competition rules may not bring about more competition’.198 
 We do not need to speculate any further on the invisible game of politics, which is obvious and fully confirmed by a 
clearly expressed German political worry over the emergence of ‘supra-national’ competition rules, especially where 
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such rules contradicted the draft of the future Law against Restraints of Competition (GWB).199 However the serious 
worry was that these Brussels drafts were less stringent; thus, they would eventually be able to replace national 
regulations. Later, regarding their procedural scope, Müller-Armack again expressed concerns over a possible 
‘transplantation’ of a prohibition principle requiring authorization rather than a notification procedure, which would have 
found greater acceptance with German industry.200 His complaining tone was further notable in respect of the 
previously exposed prohibition of discrimination, which he regarded as ‘completely useless’, as it had been designed by 
the group of experts, thereby introducing ‘rigid competition criteria’; for this reason, it had to be changed to prohibit 
practices that could have as an effect ‘placing commercial partners at a competitive disadvantage among 
themselves’.201 This unfair competition rule later became part of Article 102(2)(c). Furthermore, Müller-Armack's worry 
over the above prohibition principle and authorization of exceptions was fuelled by conflicting approaches to GWB, 
causing him to propose the well-known text: ‘prohibited as incompatible with the Common Market’,202 but his major 
concern still remained that EU regulations would conflict with Germany's more stringent national regulations.203 
Could it be that Müller-Armack was right after all? As mentioned from the outset, the Directorate General for 
Competition is currently fully aware of the existence, at national level of rules that are less stringent regarding the 
dominance threshold. However, the drafting history proves that it was wrong to exclude oligopolies; it was only later that 
the European courts established jurisprudential upper limits of dominance in terms of market share. 
In order to complete the catalogue of anti-competitive practices, there was a need to address the problem of 
international restraints of competition204 by ‘market dominant undertakings (monopolies, oligopolies)’.205 
Interestingly, Chapter V of the Havana Charter establishing the World Trade Organization (1948) and GATT (1947) was an 
inspiration for the drafting of the non-exhaustive list of restrictive practices, which included hindering market access, 
sharing customers, setting contingencies, having discriminatory effects to the undertakings' disadvantage, limiting 
production, and preventing the improvement or the practical use of technical procedures, patents or non-patentable 
inventions.206 However, market dominance was not prohibited per se; that is, mergers on technological or managerial 
grounds could still be allowed.207 Finally, the reference to economic agents with considerable market share, as is the 
case with monopolies or oligopolies, was reiterated.208 It stated that comparatively, smaller cartels should be free.209 
Different regulations were needed for oligopolies created by private or public undertakings that were in a dominant 
market position. In support of the initial proposals for the Treaty of Rome, previous experiences with the ECSC Treaty 
were recalled; for example, where public or private undertakings were able to misuse their position, the High Authority 
made recommendations; the restriction of competition under Article 4 (ECSC) was annexed for discussion.210 
The term ‘dominant positions’ changed only with von der Groeben's proposal, which advanced two forms of exploitative 
abuse: (i) unilateral conduct by an undertaking, where the undertaking was ‘not being exposed to any competition or to 
substantial competition for a particular type of product or service,’211 and (ii) the merger of two or more undertakings 
that would create a dominant position. Both were later deleted in the Dutch delegation's draft proposal.212 However, the 
German delegation's vision of control of abuse of a dominant position had to cover the ‘oligopoly position’ as well.213 
So where does the recognition of the oligopoly gap really lead us? We have seen that European history prevented us from 
having oligopolies under Article 102. Is this plainly a bad thing? Previously (1960), it seemed difficult to distinguish good 
from bad, ie to distinguish between oligopolistic behaviour, ancillary and non-ancillary or price-fixing agreements.214 
This emerged in the articulation of ‘modern’ competition standards (1960-2005), which ever since has seen formalistic 
legal analysis prevail over economic analysis. It was Commissioner Monti's ‘more economic approach’ (2005) that drew 
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our attention back to oligopolies and similar challenges. 
 
E. What is the True Meaning of Distortion? 
This is a relatively simple question, since the meaning of distortion has already been addressed in the literature.215 The 
Lisbon Treaty contains the general imperative that national laws and administrative provisions which might distort 
competition among Member States due to their existing differences should be adapted.216 Nevertheless, history reveals 
a need for something new: the meaning of distortion cannot be properly understood without a look at the meaning of 
distortion at the macroeconomic level.217 In other words, over- or underrated exchange rates need to be artificially 
maintained, a consequence of which is that a whole national economy is placed at a disadvantage in international 
competition.218 This explains why the adoption of such economic and monetary policies has to be conducted in 
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition under Article 119 TFEU, that is, without 
manipulated exchange rates. This notion was strengthened even further by Article 119(2), which referred specifically to 
the need for an exchange-rate policy to maintain price stability and to support general economic policies in accordance 
with the above principle, in the same way as for Article 127(1), which relates to monetary policies and competition. 
Unfortunately, over many years, there has been no recognition of this need in competition policy statements; in addition 
there has not been the ‘efficient allocation of resources’ which Article 120 recommends. We do not need to search in the 
historical archive for macroeconomic efficiency; sufficient reason is included in economic and monetary policies, 
namely, they must be conducted so as to enhance efficiency. 
Specific distortions of competition mentioned in the 1955 document referred to taxation and social contributions, since 
both of these are cost elements.219 It was proposed that exchange rates based on market rules would sort out the 
differences in taxation; however, ‘manipulated’ exchange rates would not. Previously, in this particular context, the ECSC 
had foreseen price-setting and social insurance provisions.220 Different wages based on different productivity were not 
to be caught by competitive distortions. However, it was recommended that particularly higher or lower wages in 
specific sectors of the economy on the basis of agreements between employees and employers and which are contrary 
to the production rate should be considered as particular cases.221 Thereafter, during the same negotiations it was 
acknowledged that there was a need to harmonize national policies with regard to wages, credits, discounts and 
exchange rates.222 
 
II. CONCLUDING REMARKS: WHAT LESSONS CAN WE LEARN FROM HISTORY FOR FUTURE AMENDMENTS? 
The brief overview of the history of European competition law presented above suggests there was considerable 
inspiration in the ECSC Treaty for the Treaty of Rome, causing many competition rules to be adapted from the ECSC when 
drafting the Treaty of Rome. However, it is clear that there have been legal consequences as a result of this influence. 
The Treaty of Rome was enacted with incomprehensible gaps that enforcers became aware of only gradually; as we have 
seen, these related to both mergers and oligopolies and also to terms and conditions of contracts. Many controversies 
about how certain competition rules ought to be interpreted have never been properly resolved and over many years 
lack of European consensus  (perhaps based on differences in the use of key words) has fuelled heated debates about 
how to enforce EU competition rules. The crux of the argument has been some participants' reluctance to be overly 
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literal when enforcing European law. Is it true that we are too keen to respect the letter rather than the spirit of the law, 
as Montesquieu has suggested? It is for the European courts to reflect on this very carefully. If the answer is in the 
affirmative, is this then attributable to the Commission or to the European courts? Who is to be blamed for what 
happened when EU competition rules were drawn up, and indeed ever since? 
It appears that the negotiation process between the founding Member States--which involved a certain degree of 
political influence, mutual understanding, and acceptance of cultural differences and preferences--resulted in a kind of 
legal reconciliation, but not necessarily a successful outcome for the competition rules embedded in the Treaty of Rome. 
Many interesting and insightful original drafts were polished to the extent that their true meaning was lost. Empty of 
content, we were left to imagine the intent of the wording when it came to enforcement. This clearly suggests that 
creativity during a drafting process to make the text sound original might not be helpful. Both shifts in political emphasis 
and the reformulation of words have created problems for many competition lawyers. 
A deeper understanding of the true nature of the drafting process has yet to reveal another reason why specific words 
had to be reduced. Initially, there were only two relevant product markets, coal and steel, which were to merge 
production to promote their common interests. The Treaty of Rome proposed a wider integration of national markets 
after the famous ‘all for one and one for all’ pronouncement; the six founding fathers must have perceived the ambition 
of a European political federation as too large a consortium for the benefit of their national interests. The unseen and 
seen game of politics interfered with law-making and certain polishing and cutting has been necessary. Competition 
rules were drawn up in a way which was not sufficiently detailed, perhaps in a futile attempt to make the realization of the 
Community less likely to consolidate itself, since the dynamics of competition would help the Community to accomplish 
its mission, ie the integration of European markets. Nevertheless, it is clear nowadays that competition has not only 
attained its mission, it has also gained its own legal status with a solid normative foundation in economics and has 
cemented the cultural traditions of the currently 28 Member States into one integrated European Union, ie market. 
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commun accroîtront d'une manière substantielle l'efficience de la production ou de la distribution en ce qui 
concerne les produits visés; etb) que l'accord en cause est essentiel pour obtenir ce résultat et ne restreint pas 
l'initiative des entreprises au-delà de ce qui est nécessaire pour l'atteindre ; c) que les entreprises visées par 
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88. Memorandum (n 60) 102, which refers to the free game of competition on the common market (‘das freie Spiel 
des Wettbewerbs’ ). 
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